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Organised crime and international aid subversion: Evidence from Colombia and 
Afghanistan 





Scholarly attempts to explain aid subversion in post-conflict contexts frame the challenge in 
terms of corrupt practices and transactions disconnected from local power struggles. Also, 
they assume a distinction between organised crime and the state. This comparative analysis 
of aid subversion in Colombia and Afghanistan reveals the limits of such an 
approach.  Focusing on relations that anchor organised crime within local political, social 
and economic processes, we demonstrate that organised crime is dynamic, driven by 
multiple motives, and endogenous to local power politics. Better understanding of 
governance arrangements around the organised crime-conflict nexus which enable aid 
subversion is therefore required. 
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Introduction 
‘The elephant in the room: How can peace operations deal with organized crime?’1 is one of 
several high-profile reports that have recently called for the issue of organised crime to be 
brought ‘from the margins to the mainstream’2 of peace-building theory and practice. These 
calls reflect the growing awareness of the salience of organised crime in conflict and 
concerns that international aid might be contributing to their convergence.3 We assess the 
ability of existing scholarship on international aid and peace-building to explain the risks of 
international aid being subverted by organised crime. In this article aid subversion is 
understood as the diversion of aid away from its intended purpose. We use examples of 
international assistance to peace-building in conflict-affected countries in which organised 
crime is a prominent conflict actor.4 We find that explanations that approach organised 
crime in the context of corruption have three limitations: they are static, they are 
transaction-focused, and they treat organised crime as exogenous to the local politics of 
power. In order to understand international aid subversion by organised crime, it is 
necessary to study how the latter is linked to the local society, political process and 
economy. A particular historical trajectory of conflict and post-conflict accommodation 
needs to be traced, since organised crime actors in many contemporary conflicts strive for 
political representation.5  
Our argument requires a methodological shift away from the analytical matrix that 
juxtaposes organised crime, non-state armed actors and state structures as distinct actors 
and analytical categories. Our analysis instead foregrounds the study of the political, social 
and economic relations that enable organised crime, embodied by transnational drug 
trafficking, to be anchored within local social, political and economic processes. We study 
how organised crime shapes and is shaped by local relations. By scrutinising those relations, 
we show that, in contrast to prevailing scholarly assumptions, organised crime is dynamic, 
driven by multiple and not just rational motives,  and endogenous to the local politics of 
power throughout the conflict to post-conflict continuum.  
We demonstrate this argument in a study of international aid subversion in 
Colombia and Afghanistan. In both countries, organised crime in the form of a drug 
economy has established informal power systems, which have become institutionalised 
parallel to long lasting armed conflict. We apply a method of structured, focused 
comparison and, in line with our theoretical interest in explaining the same outcome in two 
cases, employ a ‘most-different’ case selection strategy.6 This strategy eschews variation in 
the dependent variable.7 Thus, we investigate mechanisms of aid subversion within the 
context of regressive sub-national governance developed around the organised crime-
armed conflict nexus. These mechanisms identify ‘the generative processes that, given 
certain initial conditions, produce’ specific outcomes.8 We investigate how aid is subverted; 
the impact of aid subversion on power relations and the state is beyond the purview of this 
article. Following McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, we identify three relational mechanisms that 
‘alter connections among people, groups, and interpersonal networks.’ 9  These are: 
institutional positioning, societal embeddedness and role mutation, and operate at a state, 
societal and individual level. 
In addition, we employ an embedded, as opposed to a holistic, research design to 
vary the level of analysis, from the more abstract to a sub-unit level that ‘can often add 
significant opportunities for extensive analysis.’10 Therefore, the comparison focuses on the 
mechanisms of operation around the Colombian paramilitary group Autodefensas Unidas de 
Colombia (AUC) and a group of warlords in Afghanistan’s Southern provinces. ‘Embedded’ in 
these comparisons are fine-grained analyses of aid subversion in the case of the oil palm 
initiative in Urabá in Colombia, and private security contracting along the Southern drug 
trafficking route (henceforth Southern route) in Afghanistan. We go beyond the ‘sub-unit’ 
analytical level and reflect on the broader theoretical implications that explain aid 
subversion.11 Our empirical evidence is built on primary literature consisting of court 
transcripts, government reports, expert specialised reports and local media sources, 
combined with extensive fieldwork in Afghanistan and Colombia involving semi-structured 
interviews with a range of interviewees (including officials and civil society representatives) 
and ethnographic observation. Systematic triangulation of a variety of data sources 
enhances the validity of the empirical evidence.  
The article first looks at how the issue of organised crime is addressed in the 
international aid and peace-building literature. We identify gaps in this literature, and tackle 
them in the empirical part of the article. Comparative analysis of Colombia and Afghanistan 
traces the evolution of the links between a drug economy and armed conflict, with a focus 
on political and social relations. Studies of aid subversion of the oil palm initiative in Urabá, 
Colombia, and private security contracting in the provinces of Southern Afghanistan provide 
evidence for an alternative explanation of international aid subversion.  
International aid and organised crime in post-conflict countries 
Subversion of international aid in the form of corruption surfaced as an academic and policy 
issue in the late 1980s, 12 though it remains a rare object of scholarly inquiry.13 The topic is 
addressed by two literatures: on international aid and peace-building14 and on fragile states. 
The former mirrors the mainstream debates on aid, as evidenced by research themes such 
as effectiveness, ownership, conditionality, modes of implementation, impact on 
governance and development, and anti-corruption policies.15 In this literature on 
international aid and peace-building, there is a consensus that corruption facilitates 
criminality, and vice versa.16 The research strives to disentangle various facets of this 
dynamic, in which international aid plays an integral part. In analytical terms, the interaction 
between organised crime and state actors is the central focus.17   
A parallel preoccupation with aid subversion in the fragile state literature attributes 
the prevalence of corruption to conflict-affected countries’ weak state capacity, which is 
often compounded by domestic elites’ lack of political will.18 A subset of this body of 
scholarship, with roots in the three inter-related academic fields of post-colonial studies, 
democratic transition and hybrid political orders, breaks through the limitation imposed by 
the normativity of the concept of corruption alongside its state-centred focus. In this work, 
state weakness is traced to informal (hidden) power structures that straddle political, 
economic and administrative spheres and public and private domains and their actors, and 
merge local and transnational dynamics.19 Although this strand of literature lends itself to 
more astute analysis of subversion of international aid by organised crime in post-conflict 
contexts, it does not explicitly address organised crime per se.  
In sum, the study of international aid and peace-building in the context of corruption 
has three weaknesses that limit its potential to explain the mechanics of international aid 
subversion by organised crime in post-conflict contexts. It is static, transaction-focused, and 
views organised crime as exogenous to local power struggles unleashed by armed violence. 
Even in recent attempts to construct an analytical framework fit for the post-conflict 
context,20 the static, transactional nature of corruption as a ‘practice’ and an ‘act’ 
between/among a set of actors re-emerges. Hence, there is a widespread view in peace-
building scholarship that corruption is a practice to secure impunity and protect organised 
crime groups, while the actors at the other end, namely  state officials, reap multiple 
benefits from this exchange.  
This perspective is static because it captures a snapshot of practices and transactions 
in which monetisation and actors’ rational calculation based on material incentives --  
created by the availability of international aid-- provide the explanation of organised crime’s 
involvement in aid subversion through corruption. It overlooks the tenacity and adaptability 
of conflict structures involving organised crime, and the changing identities and motivations 
of actors over the lifetime of an armed conflict. By understanding corruption as an act of 
bargaining - typically involving elites21 - between organised crime and political, business, 
military and other actors, organised crime, in effect, is viewed as exogenous to local power 
struggles. Hence, maintaining a dichotomy between organised crime vis-à-vis the state 
forecloses the analytic possibility that organised crime operates as integral to the local 
politics of power. Despite outright acknowledgment of a different nature of corruption in 
peace-building,22 a view prevails of organised crime as an actor ‘infiltrating’, ‘coopting’, 
‘penetrating’, and/or ‘capturing’ the state (or other domains) by using corruption as its 
‘capital’.23 These arguments underline an implicit distinction—even a competition—
between organised crime, the state, and other social actors.24 
Consequently, this approach obscures the thick vein of social relations that anchor 
organised crime within the very processes that shape the emergence, exercise and 
experience of governance. If, as Cockayne argues, organised crime is best studied as a 
‘system/strategy of governance’25 - a point we return to below - and if, as Brinkerhoff posits,  
‘[g]overnance is about the relationships between state and society’,26 then societal 
embeddedness is of paramount importance to understand how that system works and the 
risks therein to international aid subversion.  
This argument draws on two key analytical developments in the literature related to 
organised crime and conflict. One maps the complex relations between non-state armed 
groups and organised crime.27 The other development turns on structures, contending that 
organised crime in conflict-affected places is a ‘system’ and/or (governance) ‘strategy’ used 
by a myriad of violent actors.28 Both approaches abandon the aforementioned theory 
rooted in the discourse of criminalisation, which understands organised crime as a 
standalone non-state actor that engages in armed conflict primarily in pursuit of commercial 
goals and with no a priori political ambitions.29 
In summary, corruption as a framework for understanding the subversion of 
international aid in post-conflict contexts in which organised crime is prominent, however 
important, provides only a restricted view. This view fails to capture the complex patterns of 
organised crime-conflict alignment and the dynamic post-conflict adaptation of the 
structures thus created. We argue that an analytical shift from actors to relations is needed 
to unpack how the governance structures rooted in the organised crime-conflict nexus pose 
a risk to international aid. We study those relations in their own right, in order to shed light 
on the mechanisms of international aid subversion by organised crime in post-conflict 
contexts. Although a number of authors have begun to point in this direction,30 very little 
progress has been made so far. In the ‘causal reconstruction’31 below, we show how three 
mechanisms -- institutional positioning, societal embeddedness and role mutation -- link 
regressive sub-national governance in Colombia and Afghanistan with aid subversion (See 
Graph 1).  
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International aid subversion in Colombia and Afghanistan 
Colombia and Afghanistan represent two contrasting cases for the analysis of international 
aid subversion in terms of domestic political contexts, organised crime/conflict trajectories 
and types of drug economy. While Afghanistan is a failed state undergoing state building as 
part of post-conflict reconstruction, Colombia is a long-standing, functioning democracy 
grappling with a decades-old peace process, without intrusive international involvement of 
the kind experienced by Afghanistan. Colombia has a long history of an expansive drug 
economy run by drug cartels, whereas in Afghanistan the drug economy is more diffuse, and 
the foray into drug processing a more recent development. However, in both countries, 
criminal actors are integrated in the governing structures through complex webs of relations 
among incumbent political, economic and military actors.   
Colombia 
Drug trafficking and its coevolution with the protracted internal conflict have undermined 
political, economic and social development in Colombia since the 1980s. Although overall 
security has improved, the state still lacks effective control in some peripheral areas,32 
where guerrillas, paramilitaries and other criminal actors are still active and highly 
dependent on criminal economies, such as cocaine production and illegal mining. Helped by 
the international community (principally, the United States and the European Union), the 
Colombian state is engaged in an internal conflict with guerrillas, re-emerging paramilitary 
structures and drug traffickers. International aid has been skewed towards supporting a 
counter-narcotics agenda, set against broader goals to strengthen rule of law and promote 
sustainable development in critical regions.  
 
Organised crime and conflict actors 
 
Colombia’s increasing strength in the drugs production phase was an important factor in the 
transformation of drug-related organised crime structures. Peripheral areas were 
traditionally beyond the reach of the state and its anti-narcotics policies, the enforcement of 
which required huge investment in public security, protection and regulation. This 
motivated the left-wing Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC) and right-wing 
United Self-Defence of Colombia (AUC) and their massive armies to join the drug economy, 
managing massive requisite labour force, securing the expansion of plantations, and 
protecting crops from competitors and the government eradication efforts. By the 2000s, 
the paramilitaries and guerrillas fully controlled coca-leaf production and processing and 
were involved in trafficking. Specialisation in the production phase was an important source 
of war finance for both forces.33  
 
Unlike FARC, the origins and evolution of the AUC were steeped in crime rather than 
war. At their inception in the early 1980s, the paramilitary groups operated as drug barons’ 
private security guards. Their only organisational glue was an anti-guerrilla discourse, while 
they pursued private agendas related, among other things, to drugs trafficking,34 control of 
other illegal and poorly regulated legal activities, and accumulation of rural land through 
violent expropriation. In many regions, these groups soon became an instrument of terror of 
the rural rich, politicians, and, importantly, sections of government armed forces35 against 
the guerrillas, left-wing parties and social organisations in the central and northern regions 
of Colombia, where drug barons were involved in money laundering through massive 
investments in rural property. 
 
In 1994 small groups operating in Antioquia and Cordoba reorganised as the United 
Self-Defence of Cordoba and Urabá (ACCU) and engaged in a violent territorial struggle 
against FARC in Urabá. ACCU’s successful counterinsurgency prompted other paramilitary 
structures to join forces. By 1997, ACCU evolved into AUC, a nation-wide counterinsurgent 
irregular army with several commanders. These commanders mostly emerged out of drug 
cartels and advanced  in the criminal world. The AUC was demobilised in 2006, but new 
paramilitary structures emerged and focused mainly on organised crime.36 
 
Paramilitaries’ political and social relations  
 
Unlike guerrillas who aimed at overthrowing the state, the paramilitaries sought, as 
they spelled out during the first AUC national conference, to reclaim and not replace the 
state.37 The AUC’s links with state actors were ambivalent; while officially adversaries, they 
were tacit collaborators.38 In many central and northern regions the paramilitaries operated 
through informal arrangements with rural rich, politicians, military leaders and drug 
traffickers, affected by the guerrilla violence and threatened by democratising reforms. The 
military and police ‘subcontracted’ informally counter-insurgent tasks to paramilitaries and 
charged them with eliminating demand from the peasantry for more democratic access to 
land, as well as with eliminating political opponents and alleged guerrilla members.  
 But the AUC did not exclusively expand and act ‘on demand’. The AUC’s territorial 
expansion and actions reflected its commanders’ own political, military and economic 
agendas.39 This intersection whereby the agendas of strategic territorial actors met those of 
paramilitaries is known in Colombia as ‘parapolitics’.40 In 1997-2007, these alliances 
between the AUC and elected and appointed politicians enabled the AUC  to  control local 
electoral processes, to divert hundreds of millions of dollars from public coffers (including 
international aid) and penetrate into the judiciary and security agencies. 
 
Taking over territories also entailed a social integration strategy. An important share 
of the middle class in the AUC-controlled regions supported paramilitary action as a means 
to neutralise guerrillas. In contrast, the majority of people in the lower strata of society 
were forced either to integrate or be excluded.41 The local economy and politics were 
violently reorganised to maximise the income of the communities they dominated, and, 
hence, secure clienteles.42 The AUC accumulated land by dispossessing and forcibly 
displacing peasants (alleged guerrilla supporters) and repopulating whole areas with ‘loyal’ 
social bases. 
 
Newcomers were integrated into a new political project, as illustrated by an AUC 
commander’s statement that ‘we subsidise peasants and provide technical support through 
our people […] and we distribute the land. They owe us this’.43 Such relationships turned the 
rural and urban poor and the coca labour force into important clienteles that benefited from 
the paramilitaries’ ability to capitalise on their need for welfare provision. The social base 
was widened for the paramilitary governance project, in which criminal and legal actors and 
resources comingled and blended, providing a context for aid subversion through official 
procedures.  
 
Regional dynamics in Urabá 
 
The Urabá region, which occupies a large part of the Antioquia, Cordoba and Chocó 
Departments in northwestern Colombia, is considered the cradle of the AUC.  Violence and 
crime in Urabá have been particularly prevalent from the mid-20th century and have 
intertwined with an internal colonization process. This territory’s strategic location along 
the Caribbean coast and the frontier line with Panama, with natural seaports on the Pacific 
and Caribbean seas, mountainous systems, rain forest, and many other resources 
crystallised local elites’ goals of consolidating agro-industrial expansion and securing a 
coastal exit for international trade.44 The opening of the internal frontier in Urabá 
introduced the first wave of land structure modification via land plundering from its 
originate occupants (native, Afro-Colombian and mestizo peasants). Urabá constituted the 
ideal setting for an uncontrolled land accumulation process. The lack of state regulation 
over land property was addressed with policies that promoted the establishment of agro-
industrial systems of banana and oil palm production and employment in the 1920s and 
mid-1930s.45 Over time, the growing landless peasantry pushed for the internal frontier’s 
further opening or became plantations workers. Working conditions were characterised by 
contentious labour relations. In this context, the internal conflict started in the mid-1960s, 
accompanied by the emergence of left wing guerrillas. Drug traffickers and paramilitaries 
joined the conflict in the 1980s.   
 
As part of a massive counter-insurgent campaign against FARC, the paramilitaries 
pursued a strategy of assassinating farmers and/or violently expropriating their land. By 
1997, paramilitaries had transformed the agrarian structure of the northern Urabá region 
from small and mid-sized rural properties to latifundia, all owned by paramilitaries through 
complex chains of front men.46 They also protected many agro-industrial farms – including 
those of multinational firms in large plantation areas.47 While they supported local 
politicians, the AUC’s next step was to organise the rest of the community and the loyal 
people they brought from other places to re-populate the region. 
 
Oil palm: The new opportunity for criminal accumulation  
 
The oil palm sector  has been promoted in Colombia as a means of agricultural 
modernisation in peripheral regions, such as Urabá, which have received substantial funding 
from international agencies. In Urabá in the late 1990s the AUC violently dispossessed Afro- 
Colombian communities of parts of their legally protected collective territories in the basins 
of the Curvaradó and Jiguamiandó rivers in order to expand oil palm plantations and secure 
drug traffic. Local public notaries and officials from the regional land authority facilitated 
this process.48 The AUC then turned to a novel channel to divert international aid: civil 
society and grassroots organizations.  
 
In the early 2000s, ‘El Alemán’ – the AUC’s ‘Elmer Cardenas Bloc’ (ECB) --supported 
by key public and private actors in Urabá, created a social movement called ‘Popular 
Peasant Power’ (Poder Popular Campesino) and trained a group of wounded AUC privates to 
act as development promoters for community and co-operative work and citizen oversight 
activities.49 The Bloc controlled the election of thousands of communal action councils 
(juntas de acción communal) in neighbourhood- and county-level associations that allowed 
citizens to participate in local development decision-making and public performance 
oversight. These councils became the incubators for paramilitary-controlled town councils. 
The Bloc designated candidates in each county and neighbourhood.50 In the mayoral 
elections, each municipality in Urabá generally had two candidates (in order to avoid over-
exposure through single candidacies) chosen by the Bloc. One stood for AUC ideals and the 
other carried very little political weight. The election of its favoured candidates as mayors 
and town councillors enabled the AUC to control local administration and access local public 
finances.51 
 
Once the ECB had succeeded in controlling local communities, governments and 
budgets in Urabá, the Bloc, along with several mayoralties, promoted the establishment of a 
regional movement known as ‘For a Great, United and Peaceful Urabá’, financed 70 per cent 
by the Bloc and 30 per cent by other sources.52 Through this movement, the AUC launched 
lists of congressional candidates and obtained two seats in congress. According to the 
Supreme Court, in 2002 the ECB created an NGO called the ‘Community Association of 
Urabá and Córdoba’ – Asocomún - to promote sustainable development for associated 
communities. It sought funding from the national and subnational governments and the 
international community.  Asocomún emerged as an instrument to increase the 
paramilitary’s contribution to and control over the regional economy and politics. It met all 
legal conditions for this type of association; it was a legitimate grassroots-level organisation 
committed mainly to eradicating coca crops in the region. Asocomún’s oil palm, banana, and 
reforestation programmes attracted funding from the Antioquia Governor’s Office, several 
local governments in the region, the National Alternative Development Programme, USAID, 
the Inter-American Development Bank, and the International Organization for Migration.53 
According to Verdad Abierta, the contracts that could be traced back were worth 
approximately US$800,000.54  
 
The final stage in the process was the creation in 2006 of the ‘Social Alternative 
Project’ (Proyecto de Alternatividad Social – PASO), which was the backbone of the ECB’s 
demobilisation process. ‘El Alemán’ used PASO as a platform to develop productive 
community projects. The paramilitaries provided the land, and the displaced peasants 
returning to the region and demobilised privates became the labour force for oil palm, 
rubber, banana and reforestation projects.55  
 
Oil palm is profitable only when produced on a large scale, or by linking small 
producers to larger ones. Hence, it is a business better suited to large investors and/or big 
landowners. The Colombian government and international agencies, such as USAID, have 
sought to support small palm growers in supply chains. The unintended effect of these 
efforts was a rapid expansion of oil palm as a source of extraordinary economic benefits, 
and consequently political influence, for criminal actors. Thanks to its elaborate system of 
relations with various actors around the Urabá oil palm industry and state actors across 
multiple layers of government, the AUC gained access to significant funding from the 
national government and the international community and became involved in highly 
profitable legal activities. 
 
Afghanistan 
International aid has a long history in Afghanistan and, since the fall of the Taliban, has 
played a major role in the stabilisation of the country.56 Driven by security imperatives, aid 
has focused on counter-insurgency, which has overshadowed humanitarian and 
development assistance. The militarisation of aid entailed tolerance towards the 
involvement the local allies -- their commanders and militiamen -- in the drug economy.57 
Furthermore, the decentralised aid management made aid funds vulnerable to misuse via 
loose structure of informal networks including actors in the drug economy.58   
 
Organised crime and conflict actors 
Opium production in Afghanistan has expanded steadily during the 1980s and 1990s,59 from 
relatively modest levels reaching unprecedented cultivation levels in 2014.60 This expansion 
was driven first by a need to sustain the anti-Soviet struggle, and later by the civil war. 
Consequently, the evolution of the drug economy became intimately connected with 
conflict dynamics and the changing role of non-state armed groups.61 However, he 
expansion of the drug economy ought to be understood beyond the motivation associated 
with violent entrepreneurship.  
 
In Afghanistan’s predominantly rural economy, decades of war decimated local 
agriculture. It shifted to labour-intensive poppy growing that, for many, was a ‘low risk 
activity in high risk environment’.62 The Taliban’s support for poppy cultivation was a key 
source of its legitimacy in poppy-growing areas.63 For those farmers, businessmen and 
political elites in possession of the appropriate assets and skills, it was an effective means to 
accumulate wealth and capital. The drug economy effected changes in the country’s social 
and economic structures, reshaping existing power relations. Singh wrote that ‘[yesterday’s] 
Afghan nomads who had lost their traditional livelihoods due to economic devastation 
caused by the years of war, are today’s traders and traffickers.’64  
 
The post-Taliban era saw further expansion and commercialisation of the drug 
economy. This included in-country processing of opium into heroin, a high profit margin 
activity that began in the final years of Taliban rule. During this phase, a previously loosely 
organised and open drug economy began to concentrate within a progressively tighter circle 
of major players around a criminal/military/political nexus.65 Since then, opium poppy 
cultivation, processing and trade have become a mainstay of the local economy.66 This 
occurred despite the government’s formal commitment to counter-narcotics policy, 
reflecting the central state’s inability to assert its authority over regional power holders with 
an  independent economic resource base in the drug economy.  
Warlords’ political and social relations  
A spectrum of non-state armed groups called ‘warlords’67 proliferated during the anti-Soviet 
jihad. The identities and roles of these militias have changed over time. A sub-set of 
warlords, known as the mujahidin warlords,68 challenged the Soviet-backed regime and its 
particular vision for the Afghan state. Lacking a common vision of a new state, they turned 
on each other in a civil war over control over the government in Kabul.69 Fighting coincided 
with the warlords’ increasing involvement in drug trafficking. This involvement not only 
helped the warlords’ secure resources and recruitment, but also enabled various individuals 
and groups to pursue their particular commercial interests.70  
 
During the counter-insurgency, many of the mujahidin warlords reappeared as the 
international troops’ main allies, claiming legitimacy as anti-Taliban forces. For example, 
these warlords were  behind the 2001 ouster of the Taliban in Kandahar the second largest 
province in terms of poppy production.  This effort was spearheaded by the province’s 
mujahidin-era governor and one of the country’s three most powerful warlords.71 Many 
mujahidin warlords who were involved in the drug economy72 entered the political process. 
They filled ministries, district and provincial offices, the Afghan army and the police corps, 
while mobilising ‘multiple relational bonds’73 to family, ethnic kin, traditional authorities and 
local state institutions, as elaborated below.  
 
Regional Dynamics in the Southern Provinces 
 
The drug economy diversified most in the southern provinces of Afghanistan – Kandahar, 
Uruzgan74 and Helmand –  where poppy cultivation and trafficking in the border areas were 
most widespread and resilient, surviving into the internationally led post-war recovery 
phase. The transformation of the drug economy was linked to the emergence of a new 
generation of warlords who had kinship ties to the mujahidin warlords. Their rule was 
violent and coercive in most cases, with warlords often forcibly demanding that farmers 
grow poppy.75 In Kandahar, large swaths of government land were seized and distributed to 
the warlords’ loyal commanders.76 They mostly dispensed their power partially favouring 
groups linked to them in the provision of protection and livelihoods. However, in some 
cases, warlord rule provided a degree of stability and order.77 In the post-Taliban period, the 
militarisation of aid empowered the new generation of warlords, many of whom were key 
allies in counter-insurgency efforts. However, within Kandahar and Uruzgan, these warlords 
were perceived as modern ‘Robin Hoods of Afghanistan,’78 who distributed the wealth to 
the poorer layers of society. 
  
Warlord rule in the Southern route 
 
The Southern route refers to the road running from the Spin Boldak border crossing with 
Pakistan, via the city of Kandahar, to the town of Tarin Kowt in Uruzgan Province. It was 
heavily used as a drug trafficking corridor, particularly after heroin plants emerged along the 
road to the Pakistani border. Opium from Helmand and Uruzgan, as well as from further 
afield, was transported along this road for processing. At one point during the civil war, 
some 20 armed groups were involved in this trafficking, imposing various taxes and 
controlling the drug trade.79 According to one account, the three-and-a-half-hour drive from 
Spin Boldak to Kandahar involved crossing 24 checkpoints manned by those groups.80 Post-
Taliban, the Southern route along with Highway 1, which branches off north to connect 
Kandahar to Kabul and south to connect Kandahar to Hirat, was a vital path for supplies 
destined for international forces in Afghanistan. This road network passes through three 
provinces that were (at the start of the US invasion) and remain  the biggest producers of 
opium poppy, including Kandahar, the Taliban’s heartland. This status made these provinces 
the most insecure part of the country, requiring a massive operation to protect supply 
convoys destined for international troops. 
 
Since 2001, a private security ‘industry’ including a variety of providers, legal and 
illegal, working alongside international military forces, has surged in Afghanistan. Until as 
recently as March 2015, the section of the Southern route running through Uruzgan was 
controlled by a recently assassinated  Matiullah Khan, a local warlord who rose to become 
the regional police chief of Uruzgan.81 Some of Matiullah’s militia contingent was integrated 
into the Afghan Local Police Force, but a much larger proportion operated apparently 
independently and illegally, benefiting from informal taxation on international aid.82 
Commenting on the loyalty of his troops, Matiullah noted: ‘I have 647 men as part of the 
Ministry of Interior, but more than 3,000 men have picked up their weapons from their 
houses and are working with me. I get their salaries and other benefits from the foreigners’ 
convoys and each of them is paid $240 per month.’83 The integration into the local police of 
some of the troops helped legitimise and strengthen the operations of this group. However, 
within the rest of this group some men were also secretly on the Afghan government’s 
payroll. This group became the main security provider in Uruzgan as a result of its 
connections to local political elites such as the provincial governor (who was their war-time 
compatriot) and international backers, the ambiguous policy of the central state and 
successful rebuffs against potential competitors. Supported also by international forces 
dependent on its ‘services’, this group was able to operate with impunity. Commenting on 
the power of its commander as a de facto authority in the province, one of the Uruzgan’s 
tribal leaders commented: ‘He is not part of the government; he is stronger than the 
government and can do anything he wants.’84 Private security companies provided a 
channel through which warlords and their militias operating as security providers were able 
to tap into lucrative contracts with international actors. Many of these companies were and 
are owned or controlled by prominent individuals linked to government officials, including 
former mujahidin warlords-turned-governors. In fact, these companies served as a conduit 
for the armed groups linked to the warlords both inside and outside the government to 
continue with arms and drug trafficking85 under the guise of security provision contracted 
by the international agencies.  
 
With the arrival of US troops, a ‘new warlord’, Abdul Raziq, a close war-time ally of 
the former mujahidin warlord–turned-governor of Kandahar, and his militia took control of 
the Spin Boldak border crossing at the other end of the Southern route. Although Raziq 
became a regional police chief of Kandahar,86 he continued to control the economy around 
the border crossing through his network,87 while violently supressing  the rival Noorzai tribe 
smuggling clan. Around 700 trucks crossed the frontier linking Pakistan with southern 
Afghanistan, Iran and Central Asia each day, according to Roteb Popal, whose company, 
Watan Risk Management, was providing security for 96,000 trucks a year and charging 
US$1,500 per truck.88 The head of Afghan customs, Bismullah Kammawie, claimed in 
conversation with American officers that corruption at the Spin Boldak border post was 
‘total.’89 This comment indicates that an intricate endogenous network sustained its power 
by utilising international aid and combining it with drug trafficking activities. 
 
Analysis  
We set out to study what kinds of mechanisms based on the mobilisation of institutional, 
social and individual relations account for subversion of international aid in conflict contexts 
where organised crime plays a prominent role. An inter-regional comparative analysis of 
Colombia and Afghanistan shows how regressive sub-national governance enables aid 
subversion through institutional processes. We point to a need to understand the 
integration of organised crime into the governing structures, a process that in both cases 
was consequential despite the varying political contexts, conflict/crime trajectories, and 
drug economy types. While the AUC originated in organised crime activities around the drug 
economy, the southern warlords originated in armed conflict. Neither the paramilitaries nor 
the warlords, who nominally are non-state conflict actors, set out to challenge the state. In 
contrast, they performed important counter-insurgency functions for the state, suggesting a 
complex, mutual relationship.  
In both cases, a convergence of organised crime and armed groups over the conflict 
cycle gave rise to a system of rule in which engagement in the drug economy served a 
variety of functions. These functions correspond to the changing objectives and motivations 
of multiple constituencies, including the state actors themselves, and sections of the 
respective populations. Through this process, both Colombia’s paramilitaries and 
Afghanistan’s southern warlords developed political, economic and social ties that gave 
them power and influence that they were disinclined to relinquish when faced with the 
prospect of conflict termination.  
Transition from an open conflict produced two types of local governance 
arrangements: an arm’s-length cohabitation with the state in the case of Colombia’s 
paramilitaries, and incorporation into the state of Afghanistan’s southern warlords. Both 
actors have been able to use the multiple links solidified through the engagement in the 
drug economy to secure access to public office. Such institutional positioning has allowed 
them to tap into international aid flows using official processes and institutional means, as 
demonstrated by the oil palm and private security contracting cases. The route to public 
office led through a parallel process of social embedding, as criminal-cum-conflict actors 
developed a relationship with a broader social base. Lastly, their role mutation from 
criminals to officials was a formal exercise. In practice, they held on to old roles and links 
related to those roles. 
The official political response, supported by international aid, was demobilisation of 
paramilitaries. In Colombia, the AUC was permitted to participate in the peace process; in 
Afghanistan, the warlords were co-opted into government structures. In both cases, armed 
actors’ links to organised crime were treated as epi-phenomenal. Demobilisation and co-
optation of these arms groups was not seen to be inconsistent with organised crime 
mitigation.  Mitigating organised crime has remained part of the international counter-
narcotics agenda, in line with the narrow view of the role of organised crime in 
contemporary conflicts that remains influential among the international donors.  
Conclusion 
Our study of international aid subversion by organised crime in Colombia and Afghanistan 
has important theoretical, methodological and policy implications. Our key finding is that 
organised crime in conflict contexts is a dynamic phenomenon that lends itself to different 
configurations on different governmental, spatial and temporal scales. Hence, our analytical 
metrics needed to be adjusted accordingly. Prevailing scholarly discourses, which view 
organised crime and the state as static and separate, weaken our ability to fully grasp the 
trajectories of the organised crime/conflict/governance nexus and its implications for 
international aid. Foremost, political aspirations of organised crime actors in conflict, which 
are key to how they relate to the state and military power, ought to be fully integrated into 
conceptual frameworks for studying aid subversion.  
Our evidence demonstrates that informal power systems established around the 
organised crime/conflict nexus are diverse, dynamic and resilient as well as path-dependent 
and context-specific. Therefore, their ability to interfere and subvert international aid using 
institutional means cannot be grasped appropriately within a corruption perspective, which 
treats the role of organised crime in the peace-building process as static, transaction-
focused and exogenous to the local politics of power.  
Instead, mechanisms of aid subversion can be gleaned from a systematic study of 
the ties among the multiple actors operating at the organised crime/conflict interface and 
the structures and interactions around them, and alongside their transformation over time. 
From the international aid perspective, rather than focusing on institutions per se, scholars 
must investigate how those structures and linkages are configured in relation to governance 
processes more broadly. There is currently a glaring gap in the empirical evidence in this 
respect.90 More evidence is necessary to further develop a critique of the dominant framing 
of organised crime and international aid to post-conflict countries as a problem of 
corruption both in scholarly and policy approaches. 
 
Bibliography 
Aranguren, M. Mi confesión. Carlos Castaño revela sus secretos, (audio book), Bogotá:   
   Editorial Oveja Negra/Quintero Editores, 2001. 
Batmanglich, S., and K. Hoyer. The New Deal: Peace-building and Statebuilding  
Goals and  Organised Crime. International Alert, September 2013. 
Berdal, M. Building Peace after War. London: Routledge, 2009. 
Booth, D., and F. Golooba Mutebi. ”Development Patrimonialism? The Case of Rwanda.” 
 African Affairs 111, no. 444 (2012): 379-403. 
Boucher, A.J., W.J. Durch, M. Midyette, S. Rose, and J. Terry. Mapping and Fighting  
Corruption in War-torn States. Stimson Center Report 61, 2007. 
Brinkerhoff, D.W. “Introduction: Governance Challenges in Fragile States.” In Governance  
in Post-conflict Societies: Rebuilding Fragile States edited by D.W. Brinkerhoff,  1-23. 
London: Routledge, 2008. 
Briscoe, I., and E. Dani. Crime and Error: Why We Urgently Need a New Approach to Illicit 
 Trafficking in Fragile States?. CRU Policy Brief, May 2012. 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace-Working Group on Corruption and Security. 
Corruption: The Unrecognised Threat to International Security. Washington, June 
2014. 
Chayes, S. Thieves of States: Why Corruption Threatens Global Security?. New York: WW 
 Norton and Company, 2015. 
Cheng, C.,  and D. Zaum, eds. Corruption and Post-conflict Peacebuilding: Selling the 
 Peace?. London: Routledge, 2012. 
Clunan, A.L., and  H.A. Trinkunas, eds. Ungoverned Spaces: Alternatives to State Authority 
 in an Era of Softened Sovereignty. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010. 
Cockayne, J. ”Chasing Shadows: Strategic Responses to Organised Crime in Conflict- 
affected Situations.” The RUSI Journal 158, no. 2 (2013): 10-24. 
Cockayne, J. State Fragility, Organised Crime and Peace-building: Towards a More 
 Strategic Approach. NOREF Report. Oslo, September 2011. 
Cockayne, J. and A. Lupel, eds. Peace Operations and Organised Crime: Enemies or 
 Allies?. London: Routledge, 2011. 
Cooper, N. “Picking out the Pieces of the Liberal Peace: Representations of Conflict 
Economies and  the Implications for Policy.” Security Dialogue 36, no. 4 ( 2005): 463-478. 
Cordesman, A.H. The Afghan War in 2013. Meeting the Challenges of Time. Vol 2 of Afghan 
Economics and Outside Aid. Washington: Center for Strategic and International 
Studies, 2013. 
Cornell, S.E.” Narcotics nd Armed Conflict: Interactions and Implications.”Studies in Conflict 
 and Terrorism 30, no. 3 (2007): 207-227.  
Cramer, C. , L. Hammond, and J. Pottier, eds. Researching Violence in Africa: Ethical 
 Dilemmas and Methodology Challenges. Amsterdam: BRILL, 2011. 
Cremer, G. Corruption and Development Aid: Confronting the Challenges. Boulder, CO: 
 Lynne Reiner, 2008. 
Cubides, F. “De lo privado y de lo público en la violencia colombiana: los paramilitares.” In 
Las violencias: inclusión creciente, edited by J. Arocha, F. Cubides and M. Jimeno, 
Bogotá, CES-Universidad Nacional de Colombia. 1998. 
Dobovsek, B. “Economic Organized Crime Networks in Emerging Democracies.” 
 International Journal of Social Economics 35, no. 9 ( 2008): 679-690. 
Dorronsoro, G. Revolution Unending: Afghanistan 1979 to the Present. New York: Columbia 
 University Press, 2005. 
Dube, O., and S. Naidu. Bases, Bullets and Ballots: The Effects of US Military Aid on 
 Political Conflict in Colombia. Center for Global Development WP 197, 2010. 
Duncan, G. Los señores de la guerra: de paramilitares, mafiosos y autodefensas en 
 Colombia. Bogotá: Planeta/Fundación Seguridad y Democracia, 2007. 
Escobar, M. ”Paramilitary Power and ‘Parapolitics’: Subnational Patterns of Criminalisation 
of Politicians and Politicisation of Criminals in Colombia.” PhD diss., London School of 
Economics and Political Science, 2013. 
Felbab Brown, V. Aspirations and Ambivalence: Strategies and Realities of 
Counterinsurgency and Statebuilding in Afghanistan. Washington: Brookings 
Institutions, 2013. 
Felbab Brown, V. Shooting up: Counterinsurgency and the War on Terror.  Washington: 
 Brookings Institution, 2010. 
Forsberg, C. Politics and Power in Kandahar. Washington: The Institute for the Study of 
 War, April 2010. 
Gall, C. The Wrong Enemy: America in Afghanistan 2001-2014. New York: Houghton 
 Mifflin Harcourt, 2014. 
Gastrow, P. Termites at Work: Transnational Organised Crime and State Erosion in Kenya. 
International Peace Institute, September 2011. 
George, A.L., and  A. Bennett. Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences. 
 MIT Press: Cambridge, MA, 2005. 
Gerring, J.  “Case Selection for Case-study Analysis: Qualitative and Quantitative 
Techniques.” In The Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology, edited by J.M. Box-     
Steffensmeier, H.E  Brady and D Collier. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. DOI  
10.1093/oxforshb/9780199286546.003.0028  
Giustozzi, A. The Missing Ingredient: Non-ideological Insurgency and State Collapse in 
Western Afghanistan, 1979-1991. London: London School of Economics and Political 
Science, Crisis States Working Paper no. 11, 2007. 
Giustozzi, A., and Ullah, N. “Tribes” and Warlords in Southern Afghanistan 1980- 
   2005.” Zurich: CSRC.  Working Paper no. 2, 2006. 
Giustozzi, A.  Respectable Warlords? The Politics of State-building in Post-Taliban 
Afghanistan. London: London School of Economics and Political Science, Crisis States 
WP no 33, 2003. 
Goodhand, J. “Corrupting or Consolidating the Peace? The Drug Economy and Post-conflict 
Peacebuilding in Afghanistan.” In Corruption and Post-conflict Peacebuilding: Selling 
the Peace?, edited by Cheng, C. and D. Zaum, 144-162. London: Routledge, 2012.  
González, F., I Bolívar, and T. Vázquez. Violencia política en Colombia. De la nación 
 fragmentada a la construcción del Estado, Bogotá: CINEP, 2002. 
Gutierrez, F. Criminal Rebels? A Discussion of Civil War and Criminality from the 
Colombian Experience, Crisis States Research Centre Working Papers Series 1, no 27. 
London: London School of Economics and Political Science, 2003. 
Human Rights Watch. The Ties that Bind: Colombia and Military-Paramilitary Links. 
 London, 2000. 
International Crisis Group. Aid and Conflict in Afghanistan. Asia Report 210. Brussels, 2011. 
Jaramillo, S., and G. Duncan. De la transacción a la construcción: el proceso con las 
   autodefensas, Bogotá: Corporación Nuevo Arco Iris/FESCOL, 2006. 
Kavanagh, C. Getting Smart and Scaling up: Responding to the Impact of Organised 
Crime on Governance in Developing Countries. New York: New York University 
Center for  International Cooperation, June 2013. 
Kemp, W., M Shaw, and A. Boutellis. The Elephant in the Room: How Can Peace 
 Operations Deal with Organized Crime?. Washington: International Peace Institute, 
 June 2013. 
Kemp, W., and M. Shaw. From the Margins to the Mainstream: Toward an Integrated 
Multilateral Response to Organised Crime, Washington: International Peace 
Institute, 2014. 
Lampe, K. ”Transnational Organised Crime: Challenges for Future Research.” Crime, Law 
 and Social Change 58, no. 2 (2012): 178-195. 
Le Billion, P. “Buying Peace of Fuelling War? The Role of Corruption in Armed Conflicts.” 
 Journal of International Development 15, no. 4 (2003): 413-426. 
Maass, C. D. Afghanistan’s Drug Career: Evolution from a War Economy to a Drug 
 Economy.  Kabul: Afghanistan Analysts Network, March 2011. 
MacDonald, D. Drugs in Afghanistan: Opium Outlaws and Scorpion Tales. London: Pluto 
 Press, 2007.  
Mac Ginty, R. “Warlords and the Liberal Peace: Statebuilding in Afghanistan.” Conflict, 
 Security and Development 10, no. 4 (2010): 577-598. 
Marquette, H. “Donors, State Building and Corruption: Lessons from Afghanistan and the 
 Implications for Aid Policy.” Third World Quarterly 32, no. 10 (2011): 1871-1890.  
Mayntz, R. “Mechanisms in the Analysis of Social Macro-Phenomena.” Philosophy of the 
   Social Sciences 34, no. 2 (2004): 237-259. 
Mansfield, D.  All Bets are off: Prospects for (B)reaching Agreement and Drug Control in 
Helmand and Nangarhar Provinces in the Run up to Transition, Kabul: AREU, 2013. 
Marat, E. The State-Crime Nexus in Central Asia: State Weakness, Organised Crime, and 
Corruption in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Central Asia Caucasus Institute Silk Road 
Paper, October 2006. 
McAdam, D., S. Tarrow and C. Tilly. Dynamics of Contention. Cambridge: Cambridge 
   University Press, 2001.  
McMullin, J. “Organised Criminal Groups and Conflict: The Nature and Consequences of 
 Interdependence.” Civil Wars  11, no. 1 (2009): 75-102. 
Mukhopadhyay, D. Warlords, Strongmen Governors and State Building in Afghanistan. 
 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014. 
Owen, T., and A . Grisby, In Transit: Gangs and Criminal Networks in Guyana. Small Arms 
 Survey Working Paper no. 11, 2012. 
Parsons, J. J. Urabá, salida de Antioquia al mar. Medellín: Gobernación de Antioquia, 1996. 
Poole, L. Afghanistan: Tracking Major Resource Flows, 2002-2010. Global Humanitarian 
 Assistance  Briefing Paper, Wells, United Kingdom, January 2011. 
Reno, W. “Transforming West African Militia Networks for Post-war Recovery.” 
 Comparative Social Research 27 (2010): 127-149. 
Reyes, A. ’Geografía de la Guerra’, Bogotá: Universidad Nacional de Colombia, 2008. 
Roldán, M. Blood and Fire: La Violencia in Antioquia, Colombia, 1946-1953. Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2002. 
Rosen, L., and K, Katzman.  Afghanistan: Drug Trafficking and the 2014 Transition. CRS 
 Report, 2014. 
Rubin, B. ”The Political Economy of War and Peace in Afghanistan.” World Development 
  28, no. 10 ( 2010): 1789-1802. 
Sharan, T. “The Dynamics of Elite Networks and Patron-client Relationships in Africa.” 
 Europe- Asia Studies 63, no. 6 (2011): 1109-1124. 
Shaw, M.  “Drug Trafficking and the Development of Organised Crime in Post-Taliban 
Afghanistan.” Chap. 7 in Afghanistan’s Drug Industry: Structure, Functioning, 
Dynamics and Implications for Counter Narcotics Policy edited by D. Budenberg and 
W. A. Byrd, 189-214. Washington: UNODOC & World Bank, 2006. 
Shurke, A., and M. Berdal, eds. The Peace in Between: Post-war Violence and Peace-Building.  
London: Routledge, 2012. 
Shetter, C., R. Glassner, and M. Karakhail. “Beyond Warlordism: The Local Security Structure 
 in Afghanistan”, Internationale Politik und Gesselschaft 2 (2007): 136-152. 
Shively, W.P. “Case selection: Insights from “Rethinking Social Inquiry.” Political Analysis  
14, no. 3 (2006): 344-347. 
Singh, D.G. Drug Production and Trafficking in Afghanistan, New Delhi: Pentagon Press. 
 2007. 
Staniland, P. ”States, Insurgents and Wartime Political Orders.”Perspectives on Politics 10, 
no. 2 (2012): 243-264. 
Thoumi, T. Illegal Drugs, Economy and Society in the Andes, Washington DC: Woodraw 
 Wilson Center Press, 2003. 
Tierney, J.F. Warlords, Inc.: Extortion and Corruption along the US Supply Chain in 
 Afghanistan. Washington, DC: US House of Representatives, 2010. 
UNODC (United nations Office for Drugs and Crime). Afghanistan Opium Survey 2014,  2014. 
Von Billerbeck, S. “Aiding the State or Aiding Corruption in Post-conflict Countries.” In 
Corruption and Post-conflict Peacebuilding: Selling the Peace?, edited by Cheng, C. 
and D. Zaum, 80-97. London: Routledge, 2012. 
World Bank, World Development Report  2011. Washington, 2011.  
Yin, R. K. Case Study Research: Design and Methods. 4th ed. Los Angeles: Sage, 2009. 
Zuercher, C.  “Conflict, State Fragility and Aid Effectiveness: Insights from Afghanistan.” 






Dr Vesna Bojicic- Dzelilovic (corresponding author) 
Department of International Development, London School of Economics and Political 
Science, London, Houghton St, London WC2 2AE, United Kingdom; Tel: +44 20 79556606, E-
mail: v.bojicic-dzelilovic@lse.ac.uk  
 
Dr Denisa Kostovicova 
Department of Government, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, 
United Kingdom, Houghton St, London WC 2AE, United Kingdom; Tel: +44 20 79556916; E-
mail: d.kostovicova@lse.ac.uk 
 
Dr Mariana Escobar 
 
Deputy Director, Department for Social Prosperity, Government of Colombia, Carrera 3A No. 
59-23 apto 501, Colombia; Tel: +57 3175115779; E-
mail: mariana.escobar.arango@gmail.com  
 
Jelena Bjelica  
Independent researcher. Pere Todorovica 11, Belgrade, Serbia, Tel:  +381 649431106; E-
mail: jbjelica@yahoo.com. 
 
Notes on Contributors: 
 
Dr Vesna Bojicic-Dzelilovic is Senior Research Fellow at the Department of International 
Development at the London School of Economics and Political Science in the United 
Kingdom. Dr Bojicic-Dzelilovic’s research interests include political economy of conflict and 
post-conflict reconstruction, international aid, decentralisation and regional development. 
 
Dr Denisa Kostovicova is Associate Professor of Global Politics at the Department of 
Government at the London School of Economics and Political Science in the United 
Kingdom. Dr Kostovicova specialises in post-conflict state-building and reconstruction, civil 
society and transitional justice, and European integration of the Western Balkans.  
 
Dr Mariana Escobar has a PhD in Political Science from the London School of Economics and 
Political Science. She worked as a research assistant on AFD-funded project the ‘Networks of 
Regressive Globalisation’ based at the LSE. She is currently a Deputy Director of the 
Department for Social Prosperity of the Government of Colombia. 
 
Jelena Bjelica holds an MA in journalism and is currently an independent researcher. She is 
an expert and practitioner in development, with specific interests in Kosovo and 
Afghanistan, where she was previously based with the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODOC) and the 




Main part of this work has been supported by Agence Française de Développement (AFD) 
under Grant RGG-U257. Any opinions, findings and conclusions in this article are those of 
the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of AFD, or any other organisation the 





1 Kemp, Shaw and Boutellis, The Elephant in the Room.   
2 Kemp and Shaw, From the Margins to the Mainstream. 
3 World Development Report 2011; Cockayne, ”Chasing Shadows”; Briscoe and Dani, Crime 
and Error; and Kavanagh, Getting Smart and Scaling up. 
4 In those contexts international aid to peacebuilding is typically comingled with 
development aid. 
5 McMullin, “Organised Criminal Groups”; and Felbab Brown, Shooting up. 
6 George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development.   
                                                          
7 Gerring, “Case Selection”, 19. 
8 Mayntz, “Mechanisms”, 253. 
9 McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, Dynamics of Contention, 26. 
10 Yin, Case Study Research, 52. In this study we go from the national to the regional level of 
analysis. 
11 Yin, Ibid., and Shively, “Case Selection”, 347. 
12 Cremer, Corruption and Development Aid. There is a burgeoning literature on corruption 
whose review goes beyond the remit of this paper.   
13 Zuercher, ”Conflict, State Fragility”. 
14 Lampe, ”Transnational Organised Crime.” 
15 Le Billion, “Buying Peace”; von Billerbeck, “Aiding the State”; and Marquette, “Donors, 
State building and Corruption.” 
16 Goodhand, “Corrupting or Consolidating the Peace?.”; Batmanglich and Hoyer, The New 
Deal;  and Marat, “The State-Crime Nexus.” 
17 Cheng and Zaum, Corruption and Postconflict Peacebuilding; and Batmanglich and Hoyer, 
The New Deal. 
18 Gastrow, Termites at Work.   
19 Mukhopadhyay, Warlords, Strongmen Governors; Suhrke and Berdal, The Peace in  
Between; Clunan and Trinkunas, Ungoverned Spaces; and Staniland, “States, Insurgents.” 
20 Cheng and Zaum, Corruption and Postconflict Peacebuilding. 
21 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace-Working Group on Corruption and Security, 
Corruption. 
22 Boucher at al., Mapping and Fighting Corruption. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
23 Dobovsek, “Economic Organized Crime Networks.” 
24 Briscoe and Dani, Crime and Error. 
25 Cockayne, State Fragility.   
26 Brinkerhoff, “Introduction,” 18.   
27 Reno, “Transforming West African Militia Networks”; Cramer, Hammond and Pottier, 
Researching Violence; Berdal, Building Peace; Giustozzi, The Missing Ingredient; Cockayne 
and Lupel, Peace Operations; and Felbab Brown, Aspirations and Ambivalence.   
28 Mc Mullin, “Organised Criminal Groups”; Briscoe and Dani, Crime and Error; Cockayne, 
“Chasing Shadows” and Shetter, Glassner and Karakhail, “Beyond Warlordism.” 
29 This scholarship uses the concept of conflict networks to question the analytical 
 traction of the usual  tropes of state, non-state and organised crime actors. See: Sharan “ 
The Dynamics of Elite Networks”, and Owen and Grisby, In Transit. 
30 Felbab  Brown, Aspirations and Ambivalence;  Zuercher, “Conflict, State Fragility”; Briscoe 
and Dani, Crime and Error; Chayes, Thieves of States; and Booth and Golooba Mutebi, 
”Development Patrimonialism.” 
31 Mayntz, “Mechanisms.” 238. 
32 Duncan, Los señores de la Guerra; and Cubides “De lo privado y de lo público en la  
violencia colombiana.” 
33 Cubides, Ibid.;  and Gutierrez, Criminal Rebels?. 
34 Thoumi, Illegal Drugs. 
35 Human Rights Watch, The Ties that Bind; and Dube and Naidu, Bases, Bullets. 
36 Duncan, Los señores de la Guerra. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
37 AUC, [Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia], Constitución de las Autodefensas Unidas de  
Colombia. 
38 Felbab Brown, Shooting up; and Cornell, “Narcotics and Armed Conlict.” 
39 Aranguren, Mi confesión. 
40 Escobar, Paramilitary Power. 
41 González, Bolívar and Vázquez, Violencia política. 
42 Jaramillo and Duncan, De la transacción. 
43 Aranguren, Mi confesión. 
44 Roldán, Blood and Fire. 
45 Parsons, Urabá, salida de Antioquia al mar. 
46 “Los pecados terrenales de Sor Teresa Gómez Álvarez” (Verdad Abierta, January 11, 
2011). http://www.verdadabierta.com/index.php?option=com_content&id=2963. 
47 According to the Colombia General Attorney’s Office, between 1997 and 2004, Chiquita 
brands paid $1.7 million to the AUC in the Urabá region. “Los 'pecados' de Chiquita Brands” 
(El Espectador, December 10, 2012). http://www.elespectador.com/noticias/judicial/los-
pecados-de-chiquita-brands-articulo-391790. 
48 “La palma y los paramilitares en el Chocó” (Verdad Abierta, September 7, 2011). 
http://www.verdadabierta.com/despojo-de-tierras/3526-la-palma-y-los-paramilitares-en-
choco 
49 SCJ-30126, [Supreme Court of Justice], Sentence 30126 against Ramon Antonio Valencia 
Duque, 14 December 2010. 
50 Ibid. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
51 Interview with (*) Rodrigo (reserved identity), official of USAID in Colombia, Bogotá, April 
6, 2011. 
52 SCJ-30126. 
53  “La debacle del partido de Luis Alfredo Ramos” (La Silla Vacía, February 9, 2011). 
http://www.lasillavacia.com/historia/la-debacle-del-partido-de-luis-alfredo-ramos-21553. 
54 The Supreme Court of Justice established that the politicians intensively lobbied 
governmental institutions and Plan Colombia instances (SCJ-30126, 2010) for the Asocomún 
projects. 
55  “Proyecto cauchero en tierras despojadas?” (Verdad Abierta, October 3, 2011). 
http://www.verdadabierta.com/component/content/article/158-captura-de-rentas-
publicas/3583-iproyecto-cauchero-en-tierras-despojadas/ 
56 International Crisis Group, Aid and Conflict in Afghanistan. 
57 Goodhand, “Corrupting or Consolidating Peace”; and Singh, Drug Production. 
58 Poole, Afghanistan Tracking Major Resources. 
59 Goodhand, “Corrupting or Consolidating Peace”; Maass, Afghanistan’s Drug Career; 
Schetter, Glassner and Karokhail, “Beyond Warlordism”; Mansfield, All Bets are off; and 
Felbab Brown,  Aspirations and Ambivalence. 
60 In 2014, opium cultivation reached 224,000 hectares, and the annual output of 6,400 
tons, boosted by a sharp rise in the production in Southern regions where the yields 
increased by 27 per cent year on year. UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2014. 
61 UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2014; and Singh, Drug Production. 
62 Shaw, “Drug Trafficking,”71. 
63 Felbab Brown, Shooting up, 136; and Singh, Drug Production, 133. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
64 Singh, Drug Production, 135. 
65 Felbab Brown, Shooting up; and Maas, Afghanistan’s Drug Career. 
66 Rosen and Katzman, Afghanistan: Drug Trafficking. 
67 On the notion of warlord see Giustozzi, Respectable Warlords?; Schetter, Glassner and 
Karohkail, “Beyond Warlordism”; and Mac Ginty, “Warlords.” 
68 Dorronsoro, Revolution Unending, 106. 
69 Shaw, “Drug Trafficking”; and Giustozzi and Ullah, Tribes. 
70 Singh, Drug Production, 237; and Cordesman, The Afghan War, 137. 
71 Gall, The Wrong Enemy. 
72 Singh, Drug Production, 238. 
73 Mansfield, All Bets are off. 
74 Uruzgan is also spelled as Urōzgān, Oruzgan, Orozgan, or Rozgan. 
75 Forsberg, Politics and Power in Afghanistan. 
76 Ibid, 15. 
77 MacDonald, Drugs in Afghanistan.   
78 Interview with Roteb Popal, Head of Watan Risk Management Company, Kabul, Aug. 
2011. 
79 Singh, Drug Production, 105. 
80 Ibid., 237. 
81 Ahmet, A. “Powerful Afghan Police Chief Killed in Kabul” (New York Times, March 19 
 2014). 
82 Interview with Matthieu Aikins, journalist, Kabul, October 2011; Filkins, D. “With US Aid 
Warlord builds Afghan Empire” (New York Times, June, 5 2010).  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
83 Who is Who in Afghanistan, http://www.afghan-
bios.info/index.php?option=com_afghanbios&id=1489&task=view&total=2230&start=1657
&Itemid=2. 
84 Tierney, Warlords, Inc. 
85 Rubin, ”The Political Economy of War and Peace in Afghanistan.” 
86 Mashal, A. “Afghan Police Chief, Longa a Taliban Target, Faces a New Emotion: Fear” (New 
York Times, May 30, 2015). 
87 Aikins, M. “The Master of Spin Boldak: Undercover with Afghanistan’s Drug Trafficking 
Border Police” (The Harpers Magazine, December 1, 2009). 
88 Interview with Roteb Popal, owner of Watan Risk Management security company, Kabul, 
August 2011. 
89 Who is Who in Afghanistan?. 
90 Cooper, “Picking out the Pieces.” 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Graph 1: Organised Crime and International Aid Subversion 

